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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER THE
FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
Weinberger v. Romero-Borcelo
456 U.S. 305 (1982)
ANDRIENNE BECKER NAUMANN*

In 1978, environmentalists applauded the United States Supreme
Court's decision in TVA v. Hill' to permanently enjoin the completion
of an enormous federal dam in order to save an endangered species of
fish. The decision was noteworthy because it illustrated the Supreme
Court's willingness to use a permanent injunction, under the authority
of an environmental statute, to preserve valuable ecological assets.
Four years later, however, in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,2 the Court
retreated from its position on environmental protection and the availability of injunctive relief. Instead, the Court refused to issue a preliminary injunction even though there was a discharge of pollutants into
national waters in violation of statutory requirements.
The Romero-Barcelo Court considered whether the enforcement
provisions of the 1972 Federal Clean Water Amendments (FWPCA)
pre-empted a federal district court's inherent equitable power to withhold a preliminary injunction. 3 The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
had sought to enjoin the Navy from conducting bombing practice off
the Puerto Rican coast. 4 The district court denied the preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs had not made a sufficient demonstration
of irreparable harm.5 The district court also found that national security and preservation of sea lanes made it imperative that the Navy continue its bombing maneuvers. Therefore, the district court allowed the
bombing practice to continue prior to the issuance of a permit, as re6
quired by the FWPCA.
Without addressing the merits of the district court's decision, the
* B.A., Biology, University of Chicago, 1971; M.S., Biology, University of Illinois, 1973;
J.D., lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1984.
1. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
2. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
3. Id. at 306-07.
4. Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979), agftd sub. noma., 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
5. Id. at 706-07.
6. Id. at 708.
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Supreme Court affirmed the power of the district court to deny injunctive relief.7 The Court found that the Clean Water Act, unlike the Endangered Species Act considered in TVA v. Hill, did not displace a
federal court's traditional equitable power to withhold preliminary injunctions. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on the Clean
Water Act's legislative history and statutory interpretation, as well as
previous Supreme Court decisions and policy.
The tension between judicial equitable authority and Congress'
power to provide injunctive relief arises whenever the district courts
must determine whether an ambiguous statutory remedy is permissive
or mandatory. The need for a preliminary injunction in environmental
litigation is particularly urgent because certain kinds of damage can be
very dangerous. Nevertheless, in the context of equally important
countervailing federal concerns, Romero-Barcelo reflects a trend to give
government agencies more latitude to pollute when other national policies are at stake.
This comment will discuss how federal courts have handled injunctions under other federal statutes. The focus will then shift to the
legislative history of the 1972 Clean Water Act amendments and the
relevant case law. The analysis will show that the finding in RomeroBarcelo that the Clean Water Act has not totally pre-empted a trial
court's equitable discretion does not depart from most previous decisions. Instead, the court may still consider policy and irreparable harm
as well as legislative intent, when withholding statutory injunctive relief. Thus, Romero-Barcelo is a potentially useful precedent for the
federal courts to deny preliminary injunctions in the wake of superseding national policies or in the absence of irreparable harm to the plaintiff. However, lower federal courts have been more willing to grant
injunctive relief when it is provided for by statute, without the traditional showing of irreparable harm, in order to achieve the concerns
expressed by the statute. It is likely these courts will limit RomeroBarcelo to its facts. 9
BACKGROUND

Standards/orthe Grant or Denial of Injunctive Relief
A trial judge may order injunctive relief if he finds there is immi7.
8.
9.
ENVTL.

456 U.S. at 320.
Id. at 311-320.
See Comment, Supreme Court Declares Injunctions Optionalfor FWPCA Violations, 12
L. REP. 10060, 10063 (1982).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

nent danger of irreparable injury. An appellate court may overturn the
order if there is error or abuse of discretion. Because an injunction is
an extraordinary remedy,' 0 however, four traditional requirements for
injunctive relief retain practical significance: First, no permanent or
interlocutory (preliminary) injunction is granted unless the legal remedy is clearly inadequate. I Secondly, the court will not grant a preliminary injunction except to prevent irreparable harm.' 2 Evidence of this
harm must be stronger than that needed to issue an injunction as a
permanent remedy after the trial. Thirdly, the court will deny temporary relief except on a strong showing that the applicant will ultimately
succeed on the merits. 13 Finally, where hardships will result in loss to
either party which are not compensable as damages, the court must
balance the possibility of irretrievable loss to either side.14 Rule 65 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has expressly incorporated the
second of the above four considerations in its criteria for issuing temporary restraining orders. ' 5 In addition, the three other traditional re-

quirements for preliminary injunctive relief often appear in federal
10. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 105, 111 (1973). An injunction is an equitable decree issued by a
court which directs an individual to act, or prohibits him from acting in a certain manner. Id. at
105. It may be enforced by a court's contempt order so that a recalcitrant party can be imprisoned, fined, or deprived of the right to litigate his grievance. Id. Equitable jurisdiction should be
distinguished from subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction involves the power of
the court to hear the case. Any decree a court issues without the requisite subject matter jurisdiction is always void. M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 (2d ed. 1979). Equitable jurisdiction,
however, is merely a designation for the kinds of cases which were historically heard by the English chancellor instead of the English common law courts. As a result, an equitable remedy is
enforceable even if it is erroneously issued. DOBBS at 105.
Some injunctive orders are issued without a full hearing on the facts. Id. at 106. Some may
be issued even before the defendant has an opportunity to appear and make a defense. Therefore,
the form of the relief, the standards under which it is granted or denied, and procedural safeguards are very important.
A preliminary injunction is an order which is granted as an emergency measure before a full
hearing can be held. Id. at 106. There must be notice to the defendant and a hearing on the
motion. If the party against whom the preliminary injunction acts is sufficiently aggrieved, the
trial judge may stay the order while the appropriatness of the preliminary injunction is reviewed.
Id. at 107. In fact, some statutes even authorize a mandatory stay while the appellate court reviews the interlocutory order. Id.
i1. Id. at 108. "Inadequate" means that the legal remedy, usually money damages, will not
give the plaintiff the compensation he desires, or will not prevent further harm from occurring.
Id. at 57-8.
12. Id. at 109.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Rule 65(b) reads in pertinent part:
A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the
adverse party or to his attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by
affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard
in opposition. . ..

FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (1982).
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cases, although these requirements are not expressly listed in the text of
Rule 65.16
Unfortunately, the courts often do not distinguish in their opinions
between the tests for permanent' 7 and preliminary 8 injunctions but the
line of demarcation seems to be the following: for a preliminary injunction the plaintiff always has to satisfy the four part test. 19 For permanent injunctions the most important component is inadequacy of a
legal remedy, coupled with irreparable harm to the plaintiff.20 As the
decisions below indicate however, the courts which do mention these
16. See Webb v. Board of Educ., 223 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ill. 1963). The court denied the
preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a high probability of success on
the merits. There remained a substantial question of fact as to whether the school superintendent
and the Board of Education of the City of Chicago had purposely maintained the schools in a
segregated manner thus causing the harm which the plaintiffs alleged in the complaint.
See also Grier v. Bowker, 314 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). This court denied a preliminary
injunction to eliminate summer school fees at certain New York City colleges. The court upheld
its denial saying that the plaintiffs had been unable to estimate the number of community college
students who wished to attend summer school but could not because of the tuition. Since this
showing was necessary for probable success on the merits, a prerequisite for the preliminary injunction, the issue of irreparable harm became moot.
As for whether the federal courts can issue a preliminary injunction under Rule 65 without a
showing of irreparable harm, see Pharmaceutical Manufacturers v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 444
(D.D.C. 1975). The pharmaceutical company requested a preliminary injunction to prevent the
FDA from releasing information about its drugs without giving it notice. Judge Sirica denied the
request, stating that the four-part test applied. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, they had not
demonstrated the likelihood of success on the merits or the likelihood of irreparable harm.
Another case decided under the Rule, Florida Medical Assoc. v. U.S. Dept. of Health, Educ.
and Welfare, 601 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1979) held that the four-part test must be followed when
granting preliminary injunctions in the federal courts. The court stated:
With few exceptions, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the procedures
to be followed in the United States district courts . . . Neither the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction nor the All Writs Act empower a district court to abandon the Rules whenever they prove procedurally inconvenient. . . A preliminary injunction, however, must
be the product of reasoned application of the four factors held to be necessary prerequisites before a preliminary injunction may be obtained.
Id. at 202.
In Esquire v. Esquire Slipper Mfg., 243 F.2d 540 (1st Cir. 1975), the court held that in a suit
for trademark infringements and unfair competition, the scope of injunctive relief is governed by
the federal district court's discretion. Therefore, the language of the Lantham Act, as well as the
Massachusetts statute, should be construed as permissive with respect to injunctive relief, unless
the statute says in express language that injunctive relief is mandatory. Esquire comes closest to
addressing whether injunctive relief in a statutory provision should be presumed jurisdictional or
substantive. If jurisdictional, it merely allows the government or plaintiff to sue for injunctive
relief. The plaintiff must then look to other provisions or to the court's equitable criteria for
liability.
17. A permanent injunction is granted after trial if monetary damages will not compensate
the plaintiff for his injury, or if the injury is likely to recur numerous times. See DoBas supra note
10 at 106, 110.
18. A preliminary injunction is granted before trial under circumstances in which the status
quo must be preserved until judgment on the merits. It is also granted when it is apparent that
plaintiff will clearly prevail on the merits at the trial. DOBBS, supra note 10 at 106, 110.
19. DoaBs, supra note 10, at 108-09.
20. Id. at 108-09. However, Professor Dobbs maintains that the concept of irreparable harm
is not applied literally where permanent injunctions are involved. Id.
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criteria may use them interchangably often relying on demonstrations
of irreparable harm to the plaintiff.
Pre-emption of Equitable Jurisdiction by FederalStatutesPrior Case Law
Previous Supreme Court decisions indicate that some federal statutes may not totally pre-empt equitable jurisdiction. For example, in
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 2 1 the Supreme Court ignored statutory language

which arguably made an injunction mandatory for any violation. In
Hecht, a department store owner had inadvertently committed violations of the Emergency Price Control Act. The Court considered
whether an injunction should automatically be granted if the defendant
had made every effort to comply and an injunction was not necessary
to insure future compliance with the Act. 22 The Court held that the
injunction was not mandatory. 23 The Court seemed to say that equitable principles still applied "across the board" to any statute authorizing
equitable relief. However, the Court went on to obscure its holding
considerably by stating that proof of actual harm and lack of an adequate legal remedy are not always required when a statute provides for
24
injunctive relief to protect public interests.
The conflict between Congress and the federal courts over who has
21. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
22. Id. at 322. Section 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 provides:
Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator any person has engaged or is about to
engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of any
provision of section 4 of this Act, he may make application to the appropriate court for
an order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an order enforcing compliance with such
provision, and upon a showing by the Administrator that such person has engaged or is
about to engage in any such acts or practices a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted without bond.
Emergency Price Control Act, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23, 33 (1942).
23. Id. at 330-31. In Hecht, the petitioner operated a large department store in Washington,
D.C.. Government investigators discovered numerous violations in prices and records in several
sections of the store. However, the district court found good faith effort by the petitioner, despite
the difficulty in interpreting regulations and confusion on the part of the employees. Id. at 324-25.
The United States Supreme Court found the language of Section 205(a) of the Emergency
Price Control Act permissive with respect to granting injunctive relief. Id. at 328-29.
24. Id. at 331 (dictum). The Supreme Court did not subsequently resolve this inconsistent
dictum in United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959) (per curiam) or
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S 49 (1975). The Court in Steelworkers was consistent
with the Hecht dictum and held that no traditional showing of irreparable harm was necessary
because Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act to promote national welfare and
safety. In Rondeau, however, the Court found that a demonstration of irreparable harm was necessary for relief under the Williams Act. 422 U.S. at 55. It reasoned that because the Rondeau
litigant (a corporation) was a private party asserting a private right of action more than a mere
statutory violation was needed to trigger injunctive relief. Since the corporation conceded that it
had suffered no irreparable harm, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, held that a denial
of injunctive relief was proper. Id. at 62-65.
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the final authority to order injunctive relief also exists under several
environmental statutes. One recent Supreme Court decision, TV v.
Hill 25 illustrates how Congress has succeeded in modifying the courts'
power by using the legislative intent behind the Endangered Species
Act. 26 Cases such as Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii,27 and
Alui v. Brown 28 are important because they discuss environmental policy in the context of national security. 29 Two National Environmental
25. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
26. See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NDRC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court concluded that the Administrative Procedure Act completely
pre-empts judicial equitable discretion in the area of administrative rulemaking procedures.
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board had
originally held hearings on the license for a nuclear reactor. The subsequent rulemaking proceedings on environmental effects associated with the uranium fuel cycle culminated in an AEC ruling
on the issue, and the approval of the rulemaking procedures.
About the same time, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) revised its criteria for
environmental impact statements so that discussion of energy conservation as an alternative to a
proposed project became necessary. The AEC would not reopen the proceedings at the agency
level to reconsider the sufficiency of the original rulemaking procedures or the granting of the
license. The Court of Appeals, however, held in a companion case, Aeschliman v. United States
Nuclear Reg. Com'n, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976), that the environmental impact statement
must be rewritten according to the new CEQ criteria. It reasoned that the original report was not
sufficiently informative to the public. It also found the AEC rulemaking procedures inadequate,
although they conformed to the minimum requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Consequently, the appellate court overturned the AEC's determination on the license and its ruling. Both were remanded to the agency for further proceedings. Id. at 627-32.
The Supreme Court summarily reversed the mandatory ACRS report decree. It found that
the Court of Appeals had invaded the executive power of the agency and had intruded on Congress' power to formulate nuclear power policy. 435 U.S. at 555. Justice Rehnquist addressed the
Administrative Procedure Act at greater length and observed that its legislative history did not
indicate that the Act could be augmented by the courts, Id. at 545-46. Instead, the statute provided all the necessary administrative requirements for rulemaking procedures. Id. at 548.
The Vermont Yankee appellate court was very aggressive in its conception of the scope of its
judicial power. Perhaps its orders to refashion the rulemaking process before the AEC could be
construed as an affirmative mandatory injunction, as opposed to a negative prohibitory injunction.
However, characterization of what the appellate court did was irrelevant according to the
Supreme Court because the Administrative Procedure Act foreclosed any judicial modification of
the agency decision making processes. The problem in Romero-Barcelo was different because a
government agency was arguably not in compliance with the statutory language of the Clean
Water Act in the first instance.
27. 454 U.S. 139 (1982).
28. 437 F. Supp. 602 (D. Hawaii 1977).
29. See also Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C.Cir. 1978). InAdams, the United States was
a participant in an international treaty whereby Eskimos were allowed to hunt bowhead whales.
The United States Secretary of State failed to object when the International Committee took this
privilege away in the interest of preserving a threatened species. The Eskimos subsequently requested a preliminary injunction ordering the Secretary to abide by his original promise to allow
the hunting. However, the circuit court held that when injunctive relief "deeply intrudes" into the
core concerns of the executive branch, the court should not apply orthodox criteria for injunctive
relief. Id. at 954.
Adams is an excellent example of a case in which the federal courts did not apply the traditional four-part test for preliminary injunctive relief against the government because of foreign
policy.
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Protection Act (NEPA) cases 30 illustrate that private plaintiffs or state
governments may need more evidence of irreparable harm for injunctive relief when the defendant is the federal government.
Legislative intent
v. Hill,3'

In TVA
the Supreme Court concluded that the legislative
intent behind the Endangered Species Act of 1973 prevented the com32
pletion of a dam which threatened the existence of the snail darter.
The Court relied on the intent expressed in the congressional reports
and held that all federal agencies must " 'insure that actions authorized,
funded, or carriedout by them do not jeopardize the continued existence' of an endangered species or 'result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species.'-33 Furthermore, the TV Court
rejected the traditional balancing of equities approach. It found no
power to balance hardship if Congress had made no exemption for federal agencies from the remedial provision of the Act. Since Congress
had the expert knowledge, the Court had no authority to fashion its
own remedies. Therefore, the Court upheld the order for a permanent
injunction. 34 However, the TV4 decision did not expressly state that
the traditional four-part test for preliminary injunctive relief is abolished under the Endangered Species Act.
Nationalsecurity
TV v. Hill demonstrates how the Supreme Court deferred to congressional intent behind a federal environmental statute, in this case
the Endangered Species Act. However, when national security considerations are present, then such congressional intent may be superseded
by another statute, executive order or prudential considerations. Two
recent cases illustrate why the district court and the Supreme Court in
the Romero-Barcelo litigation found national security very relevant in
30. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465
(E.D. Cal. 1980).
31. 437 U.S. 153, 172-93. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 is presently codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1531 (1976).
32. The snail darter is a small species of perch. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 158 (1978).
33. Id. at 173, quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976). In TV, the federal government had begun
construction on a huge dam (Tellico Dam). Shortly after the passage of the Act, a small species of
perch known as the snail darter was registered as an endangered species. Consequently, the Secretary of Interior declared the area originally designated for the reservoir as the critical habitat of
the snail darter. Respondents brought the original action in a district court to enjoin completion
of the dam and impoundment of the reservoir. They claimed that completion of the dam would
violate the Act by causing the snail darter's extinction. Id. at 158-65. Furthermore, according to
the Act, all federal agencies were to give preservation of species the utmost priority. Id. at 173.
34. Id. at 193-94.
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the decision to deny preliminary injunctive relief. In Weinberger v.
Catholic Action of Hawaii,35 the Navy allegedly violated the National
Environmental Protection Act by refusing to publically disclose an environmental impact statement revealing the location of a potential arsenal of nuclear weapons. The Supreme Court held that specific
statutory protection of Navy environmental impact statements prevented the public from obtaining such information. 36 Instead, such disclosure is governed by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) which
exempts matters which are "specifically authorized . . . by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy and are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive
order. '37 Since the Navy had an executive exemption under that statute, the district court could not order disclosure under NEPA.
The requested remedy in CatholicAction of Hawaii was not a preliminary injunction but a mandatory decree to disclose information on
future nuclear weapon storage. The case is instructive however, because Congress, pursuant to the FOIA, had exempted the Navy from
NEPA requirements in the interest of national security. As a result, the
superseding policy behind another statute foreclosed the plaintiffs' request for equitable relief. In contrast, the district court in Alu/i v.
Brown3 8 faced no conflicting statute, but on its own initiative, recognized a significant national security problem. In that case, the plaintiffs
requested a preliminary injunction when the Navy held bombing maneuvers in Hawaiian coastal waters. In its decision denying the request, the court discussed its concerns over the Navy's contention that
the military readiness of the Thid Fleet would be reduced 30 to 40 percent if the injunction was granted. 39 In considering the potential loss of
35. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
See Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979) in which the court states:
Lastly, we have not the slightest doubt but that the granting of the injunctive relief
sought would cause grievous, and perhaps irreparable harm, not only to Defendant
Navy, but to the general welfare of this Nation. It is abundantly clear from the evidence
in the record . . . that the training that takes place . . . is vital to the defense of the

interests of the United States.
Id. at 707. See also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 321, n. * (1982), (Powell, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 310.
36. 454 U.S. at 144-45.
37. Id. at 144.
38. 437 F. Supp. 602, 610-11 (D. Hawaii 1977).
Plaintiffs in Aluli v. Brown included several private citizens, as well as the Protect Kahoolawee Association (the island which the Navy subjected to bombing activities was the small, uninhabited island of Kahoolawee, Hawaii). Plaintiffs' concern was primarily with preservation of the
archeological resources of the island. They filed several claims under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
39. Id.
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military preparedness, the court found that the balance of hardships
40
tipped in favor of the Navy.
Catholic Action and A/u/i demonstrate how the Navy can prevail
over environmental policy. Although these cases were originally
brought pursuant to NEPA 4 ' a similar situation surfaces as the conflict
between Clean Water Act policy and military preparedness in RomeroBarcelo.42 The Romero-Barcelo Court appears to have relied on prudential concerns similar to those in Alu/i, presumably because the facts
and requested remedy were remarkably alike.
The federal government as defendant
One Romero-Barcelo plaintiff was a political entity (Puerto Rico)
suing the federal government. Consequently, two NEPA cases 43 are
noteworthy in the context of injunctive relief when the defendant is a
federal agency, but the plaintiff is a private organization or a state
agency. In Kleppe v. Sierra Club" a private organization sued the Federal Department of Interior because of the alleged insufficiency of an
environmental impact statement concerning a coal mining operation.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to grant a
permanent injunction against the department. 45 It reasoned that
neither the statute nor its legislative history allowed a court to substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. The court found an additional reason for its conclusion: even if the court had the authority to
40. Id.
41. Aluli was litigated under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Catholic Aclion was litigated under the NEPA and the FOJA with its accompanying executive orders and
regulations.
42. See Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 707-08 (D.P.R. 1979), rev'd sub. nom. RomeroBarcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 862 (1st Cir. 1981).
43. Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA reads in pertinent part:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (i) the policies,
regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpeted and administered in
accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter and (2) all agencies of the Federal
Government shall(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,
a detailed statement by the responsible official on- (i) the environmental impact of the
proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
44. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
45. Id. at 407-08.
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substitute its own judgment, then the plaintiffs must establish irreparable injury in order to obtain an injunction. 46 Under the Kleppe facts,
there was no such harm because the existing environmental impact
47
statement adequately described the proposed mining plans.
Kleppe illustrates that when the defendant is the federal government, the Supreme Court is wary of conflict with the executive and
legislative branches. As a result, policy and legislative intent become
more crucial when the defendant is not a private party. However, at
least one court has found the reasoning of the Kleppe Court unpersuasive on the facts presented before it. In California v. Bergland,48 California sued the National Forest Service alleging that the necessary
NEPA environmental impact statement had been inadequate. As a result, roadless wilderness areas in the state were slated for development
without appropriate regard for environmental consequences. The
plaintiffs disputed the nonwilderness designation of forty-seven areas
prior to circulation of the environmental impact statement in compliance with NEPA requirements.4 9 The district court found that its role
in enforcing NEPA was limited and precise-to make the National
Forest Service follow the statute. Therefore, a permanent injunction
was appropriate until the agency submitted an environmental impact
statement, completed according to NEPA requirements.5 0 Bergland
46. Id. at 407.
47. Id. The reason that the Court found no harm in Kleppe was because the plaintiffs did not
demonstrate a need for a greater regional implementation plan. Id. at 14. The Court therefore
deferred to the "expert agency" (Department of the Interior) statement that the potential problems
of the coal-related projects could be handled without one comprehensive impact statement. Id.
See also Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978), in which an appellate court denied
a preliminary injunction against the NEPA defendant using a similar rationale. In Alaska, the
Federal Department of the Interior had offered for bid over one million acres of oil and gas leases
in the Gulf of Alaska Outer Continental Shelf. Originally the plaintiffs litigated to enjoin the sale
of the leases. They alleged that the environmental impact statement prepared prior to the sale did
not satisfy the requirements of the Environmental Policy Act. They further alleged that the Secretary of the Interior proceeded with the sale without adequate information, which was in itself a
violation of the Act. The plaintiffs did not prevail in this original suit for injunctive relief. However, they subsequently filed another suit to enjoin exploratory drilling in the Gulf of Alaska. Id.
at 466-67.
The circuit court's decision on the appropriateness of this injunctive relief was the subject of
the most recent case, Alaska. The court held that while there is, in cases of NEPA non-compliance, a "presumption" in favor of injunctive relief, such relief does not automatically flow from
every statutory violation. Id. at 485. Therefore, although the continued operation could cause
environmental harm while the Secretary conducted an evaluation, the risk was simply too small
and speculative to justify an injunction as long as the Secretary proceeded reasonably and expeditiously. Id. at 486.
48. 483 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
49. Id. at 499.
50. Id. Judge Karlton recognized that other courts in the Ninth Circuit still applied a balancing of the equities test in NEPA cases, although there appeared to be a presumption in favor of
injunctive relief. However, there seemed to be, even in these cases, the opinion that absent unu-
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did not address whether NEPA requires a preliminary injunction under
all circumstances, although the court did find that a permanent injunction was appropriate when there would be widespread destruction of
wilderness areas. 5 '
Kleppe and Bergland, although decided under NEPA, are relevant
because they resolved environmental litigation against federal government defendants; as noted previosly, the Romero-Barcelo defendant
was the United States Navy. However, for a total understanding of
Romero-Barcelo, a brief discussion of another water pollution statute,
the River and Harbors Act of 1899, is necessary because the Act is a
direct legislative predecessor to the 1972 Clean Water Act Amendments. Consequently, the Supreme Court relied on Rivers and
Harbors case law to arrive at its conclusions under the Clean Water
Act. 52 The Clean Air Act of 197013 is also crucial to understanding the
Supreme Court decisions because that statute was also a direct, albeit
younger legislative precursor of the Amendments. More importantly,
as a result of the sparsity of appropriate Clear Water Act decisions it is
necessary to analyze analogous Clean Air Act cases in order to fully
understand Romero-Barcelo.
The Rivers and HarborsAct of 1899 and the Clean Air Act of 1970
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 189954 was originally intended to
keep navigable channels clear of debris so that they would be safe for
commerce.5 5 Congress included injunctive relief as an important remsual circumstances, irreparable injury in a NEPA case could be implied by the failure of responsible government officials to properly perform their tasks in preserving the environment. Id. at 499
n. 42.
51. Id. at 498. Judge Karlton distinguished his decision in Bergland from-that in Kleppe on
the facts. In Kleppe, the Supreme Court found that an environmental impact statement was not
required. As a result, there was no violation of NEPA and therefore no statutory injury. 483 F.
Supp. at 499.
However, a collateral, but nevertheless impressive reason for issuing injunctions under NEPA
would seem to be that monetary damages flowing between sections of the federal government
would be incongruous and wasteful of taxpayers' money. More importantly, violations by government agencies, especially under NEPA, are usually specific procedural omissions which may have
an effect on long-range environmental planning. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1975)
and Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The only effective way to prevent such
deleterious effects is to enjoin the agency from implementation unless it follows the appropriate
NEPA procedures. See California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465, 498 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
52. 456 U.S. at 319.
53. Current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. 1 1977).
54. Ch. 425, 39, 30 Stat. 1121 (1899) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-411 (1976)).
55. See Note, Federal Enforcement of Individual and Corporate Criminal Liabilityfor Water
Pollution, 10 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 576, 583-84 (1980).
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edy for obstruction to navigation. 56 During the 1960s and early 1970s,
federal courts expanded the use of this remedy to actions against private real estate developers who dumped fill materials into national waterways. 57 The Supreme Court decision in Wyandotte Transportation
Company v. United States58 supported this expansive interpretation.
Congress passed the Clean Air Act in 195559 for the purpose of
preserving public health. The 1970 amendments provided for civil
penalties as well as injunctive relief.60 Since the 1970 amendments, at
56. H.R. REP. No. 1826, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. 4 (1899) (Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Bill).
57. It is interesting that some cases involving injunctive relief which arose under the Refuse
Act during the 1970s were decided under provisions which do not mention injunctions in either
permissive or mandatory language. Apparently the need for such an expansive spirit of enforcement was no longer needed after the passage of the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
As for deposit of refuse in navigable waters see 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976). See also United
States v. Asbury Park, 340 F. Supp. 555 (D.N.J. 1972). But see United States v. Kennebec Log
Driving Co., 356 F. Supp. 344 (D. Me. 1973), vacated on appeal, 491 F.2d 562 (1st Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974), on remand, 399 F. Supp. 754 (D. Me. 1975), aY'd, 530 F. 2d 446 (Ist
Cir. 1976): Equities must be considered when the court imposes burdensome mandatory decrees.
530 F.2d at 449. Cases relying on the Refuse Act to enjoin pollution by effluent emissions include:
United States v. Asbury Park, 340 F. Supp. 555 (D.N.J. 1972); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514
F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975); and United States v. Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Corp., 353 F. Supp. 451
(E.D. Ky. 1973). A problem with the Refuse Act is that it was only applicable to private pollutors.
The 1972 Clean Water Act Amendments specifically provided for enforcement of EPA standards
against government agencies.
See also Note supra note 55, at 589.
58. 389 U.S. 191 (1967). In Wyandotte, the United States Supreme Court held that the criminal penalties provided in Section 406 of the Refuse Act do not exclude the district courts from
granting appropriate civil remedies. The Court stated:
Our decisions have established, too, the general rule that the United States may sue to
protect its [own] interests. . . . The rule is not necessarily inapplicable when the particular governmental interest sought to be protected is expressed in a statute carrying criminal penalties for its violation ...
The inadequacy of the criminal penalties explicitly provided by section 16 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act is beyond dispute ...
Id. at 201-02. The Court ultimately concluded that government prosecutors were entitled to any
civil "remedy that ensures the full effectiveness of the Act." Id. at 204. See also United States v.
Joseph G. Moretti, Inc. 331 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Fla. 1971), vacated in part and remanded, 478 F.2d
418 (5th Cir. 1973), on remand, 387 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D. Fla. 1974). In Moretti, the court enjoined
the defendants from conducting dredge and fill work in the Florida Keys. The court held that the
filling of a bay constituted creation of a structure within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, the
removal of the fill was enforceable by an injunction.
59. See Currie, Relaxation of Implementation Plans Under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, 12 LAND USE AND ENV. L. REV. 541, n. 1 (1981).
60. Id. See also Section 113 of the 1970 Act which reads in pertinent part:
(b) The Administrator may commence a civil action for appropriate relief, including a
permanent or temporary injunction. . ..
(c)

Any person who knowingly(A)

violates any requirement . . . shall be punished by a fine. . ..

42 U.S.C. § 1857C-8 (1970). The section now reads:
(Violations by owners or operators of major stationary sources)
(b) The Administrator shall, in the case of any person which is the owner or operator of
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least two federal courts have granted permanent or preliminary injunctive relief when the federal government requested it. In UnitedStates V.
West Penn Power Company, 6' the government's complaint alleged that
the defendant company was emitting sulfur dioxide in violation of the
Clean Air Act. The court granted the government's request for preliminary injunctive relief because of the likelihood of success on the merits
and because there was irreparable injury. 62 However, in dicta the court
said that when a statutory injunction is available, irreparable injury
need not be shown because Congress had established the priority of
public health. 63 The Sixth Circuit court followed this approach in U.S.
v. City of Painesville64 and issued an injunction ordering compliance
with a Clean Air Act sulfur dioxide standard.
However, in two other recent cases, courts did not grant injunctions when the plaintiff was a private citizen's group or a state agency.
InAlabama Air Pollution Control Commission v. Republic Steel Corporation,65 the circuit court agreed that the defendant was making a good
a major stationary source, and may, in the case of any other person, commence a
civil action for a permanent or temporary injunction, or to assess and recover a civil
penalty of not more than $25,000 per day of violation, or both, whenever such
person(1) violates or fails or refuses to comply with any order issued under subsection
(a). . . ; or

(2) violates any requirement of an applicable implementation plan ...
42 U.S.C. § 7413 (Supp. V. 1981).
The Clean Air Act Amendments do not expressly limit the traditional power of the courts to
frame equitable decrees. However, with respect to the emergency provisions, the Report of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce said: ". . . This section also authorized issuance
of emergency orders where the public health cannot be adequately protected solely by initiating a
suit for injunctive relief." The language from both the reports and the statute indicate that injunctions should be readily available, especially when public health is at stake.
61. 460 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D.Pa. 1978).
62. The court had been embroiled in the same litigation for over four and a half years. Previous attempts by West Penn to avoid compliance included: Penn v. Train, 378 F. Supp. 941
(W.D.Pa. 1974), affd 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir.); cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947 (1975), and West Penn
Power Co. v. Train, 538 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1975). West Penn also had a proceeding pending
before a state agency during the litigation discussed in the text. 460 F. Supp. at 1313-14.
The court also noted that the company was in continuous violation of the National Ambient
Air Standards for sulfur dioxide. Id. at 1313.
63. 460 F. Supp. at 1319.
64. 644 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1981). The Painesville court dispensed with the traditional showing for injunctive relief for two reasons. First, it observed that the Clean Air Act authorized
injunctions for violations of EPA new source standards. 644 F.2d at 1193. Secondly, the court
relied on the decisions in TVA P.Hill and Hecht v. Bowles which held that a federal court's discretionary injunctive powers were tempered by congressional mandates. For example, with respect
to TV v. Hill, the Painesville court observed:
Although the Court recognized that a federal court is not 'mechanically obligated' to
grant injunctive relief for every violation of the law, the Court concluded that the clear
congressional mandate of the Endangered Species Act provided no alternative. . ..
644 F.2d at 1194.
65. 646 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1981).
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faith effort to update its pollution control equipment; furthermore,
66
there would be an undue hardship if the entire factory closed down.
Similarly, in Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Washington ,67 a private citizen's group requested a preliminary injunction to prohibit a
local business from building a shopping center and garage in their
community. The plaintiffs contended that the Clean Air Act emission
standards would be violated by automobile and bus fumes after construction. Nevertheless, the court allowed the construction to proceed.
The court found the harm too speculative and concluded that only the
Environmental Protection Agency could make such a determination
68
when the violation had not yet occurred.
These four recent lower court decisions indicate a split of authority
on whether the Clean Air Act pre-empts the traditional equitable tests.
However, as illustrated by West Penn, Congress' concern for the public
health 69 is probably the strongest argument for modification of the
traditional equitable tests under the Clean Air Act, at least when the
plaintiff is the federal government suing a private or municipal
pollutor.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act. History, Statutory
Language, and Legislative Intent
The original 1948 Clean Water Act had no viable enforcement
provisions. 70 During the 1950s and 1960s, 7 1 Congress sporadically
amended the Act but the new enforcement provisions failed for three
reasons. First, to constitute a nuisane under the Act, a violation had to
endanger the health or welfare of persons in a state other than "that in
66. Id. at 214-15. Curiously, this court did not explicitly consider any congressional priorities
or legislative intent.
67. 370 F. Supp. 1101 (D.D.C. 1974).
68. Id. at 1109.
69. "While the intended purpose of the committee bill include the above as well as others, the
primary and overriding purpose of the bill remains the prevention of illness or death which is air
pollution related and protection of the public health." Report of the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, No. 95, 95th Cong. 338 (1977).
But see Currie supra note 59. Currie points out that Congress may have overlooked a significant loophole. Section I 10(h) of the present Act only prevents the states and the Administrator
from granting extensions not authorized by statute. It does not limit the traditional power of the
courts to consider relative hardship in framing equitable decrees. Id. at 588.
70. See H.R. REP. No. 911, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., 100 (1972) which reads in pertinent part:
"The Committee has provided fast, effective, and straightforward enforcement procedures to replace enforcement conferences and 180-day notices in the Water Quality Act of 1965." Id. at 114.
See also Note, supra note 55, at 583. The author explains why the 180 day notice requirements and the mandatory conferences in the Water Quality Act of 1965 effectively precluded
timely enforcement proceedings.
71. See Note, supra note 55, at 579-83.
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,,,72 thereby presenting the difficult
which the discharge originates.
problem of proving an interstate effect. Secondly, effluent emissions
from each potential pollutor were not monitored. As a result, the government could never establish who was responsible for raising the level
of a pollutant above the maximum allowable level in a specific body of
water. 73 Thirdly, the responsibility and enforcement was delegated to
74
the individual states which were casual about reporting violations.
In 1972, Congress amended the Clean Water Act to conform substantially to the enforcement provisions in the Clean Air Act Amend-

ments of 1970 and the Refuse Act of 1899. 7 - Section 309(a) and (b)

authorized permanent and temporary injunctions by the EPA 76 while
section 504 authorized restraining orders for immediate and substantial
health hazards. 7 7 Congress amended the Act because of the documented effect of water pollution on the ecology and public health. The
amendments provided additional enforcement to combat these effects.
The House Committee Report emphasized that the EPA Administrator's emergency powers under the amended Act were such that if the
Administrator brought suit "the appropriate district court could immediately restrain any person causing or contributing to the alleged pollu72. 33 U.S.C. § 446(d)(1) (Supp. H 1949).
73. The 1948 Act provided only stream standards for a body of water. The emissions from
each polluting source had no individual limitation. See Note, supra note 55, at 579.
74. Id. at 583.
75. See House Report, supra note 70, at 100-35 and S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., IstSess. 41
(1971).
The Senate Report reads in pertinent part: "The Committee believes that the no-discharge
declaration . . . in the 1899 Refuse Act is useful as an enforcement tool... " Id. at 43. The
House Report indicates that the citizen suit enforcement provision of the 1972 amendments "follows the concepts utilized in Section 304 of the Clean Air Act. However, the legislation allows the
courts to impose civil penalties as well as injunctive relief." Id. at 121.
76. The original section 309(b) reads in pertinent part:
(b) The Administrator is authorized to commence a civil action for appropriate relief,
including a permanent or temporary injunction, for any violation for which he is
authorized to issue a compliance order under subsection (a) of this section. Any
action under this subsection may be brought in the district court of the United
States for the district in which the defendant is located or resides or is doing business, and such court shall have jurisdiction to restrain such violation and to require
compliance. Notice of the commencement of such action shall be given immediately to the appropriate State.
Pub. No. 92-500 § 309(b), 86 Stat. 860 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1976)).
77. Section 504 of the 1972 amendments reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the Administrator upon receipt
of evidence that a pollution source or combination of sources is presenting an imminent
and substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to the welfare of persons where
such endangerment is to the livelihood of such persons. . . may bring suit on behalf of
the United States in the appropriate district court to immediately restrain any person
causing or contributing to the alleged pollution to stop the discharge of pollutants causing or contributing to such pollution or to take such other action as may be necessary.
Pub. L. No. 92-500 § 504, 86 Stat. 888 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1976)).
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tion." 78 Similarly, the Senate Report approved of the Refuse Act as a
model because of its strong enforcement policy. 79 The Report noted
that the Refuse Act had succeeded because the courts had never constrained the government in its prosecutions of corporate pollutors
under that statute. The Committee wanted to incorporate this attitude
into the Clean Water Act Amendments.80
Another enforcement section added to the Clean Water Act which
had no previous counterpart was section 313: Federal Facilities Pollution Control.8 ' Congress added this provision because it was very critical of past federal agency efforts to control their own pollution.8 2 The
Senate Committee was particularly unhappy with the Defense Department which, it alleged, had "failed in halting pollution and in requesting appropriations to develop control measures. '8 3 As a result, under
section 313, Congress provided that "federal facilities meet all control
requirements as if they were private citizens."' 84 However, the Committee also noted "the impracticality of any effort to halt all pollution immediately. ' '8 5 Therefore, Congress provided Presidential exemptions
for federal agencies in the presence of a paramount national interest.8 6
78. See H.R. REP. No. 911, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. at 132. Section 504 of the 1972 Clean Water
Act Amendments is modelled after the analogous Section 303 of the Clean Air Act of 1970. Section 303 provides for injunctive relief when there is imminent danger to public health. Id. at 132.
79.

Senate Report, supra note 75, at 53.
80. The Committee also intended that, like the Clean Air Act and the Refuse Act, the enforcement powers of the federal government should be concurrent with the enforcement powers of
the states. Id. at 64.
81. The original Section 313 reads in pertinent part:
Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any property or
facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge or
runoff of pollutants shall comply with Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements
respecting control and abatement of pollution to the same extent that any persons is
subject to such requirements ...
Pub. L. No. 92-500 § 313, 86 Stat. 875 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1976)).
82. Senate Report, supra note 75, at 67.
83. Id. at 80.
84. Id. at 67.
85.

Id. at 68.

86. The 313 exemption for executive agencies reads in pertinent part:
The President may exempt any effluent source of any department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch from compliance with any such a requirement if he
determines it to be in the paramount interest of the United States to do so;
The President shall report each January to the Congress all exemptions from the
requirements of this section granted during the preceding calandar year, together with
his reason for granting such exemption.
Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 3313, 86 Stat. 875 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (Supp. III 1979)).
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Cases arising after the 1972 amendments
Before discussion and analysis of Romero-Barcelo, it is necessary
to first look at previous Clean Water Act decisions. The most significant case to define what degree of harm is necessary for preliminary
injunctions is Reserve Mining Co. v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency. 87
In 1975, the United States and Minnesota sued an iron ore processing
company to prevent the company from discharging asbestos debris into
the air and Lake Superior. The plaintiffs relied in part on the pre-1972
Clean Water Act to support their prayer for injunctive relief.88 At trial,
the plaintiffs could not establish that harm to public health had already
occurred or that the danger was imminent. 89 However, the court reasoned that "endangering" within the meaning of the Clean Water Act
was used by Congress in a preventive sense. Therefore, a showing of
potential harm rather than actual harm was sufficient to satisfy the requirement for injunctions. 90 The court decided that a sufficient showing was made when the government proved that the discharge of
asbestos called for precautionary measures rather than waiting until the
local population became ill with cancer. 9 1
87. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). The United States Supreme Court has recently had two
opportunities to rule on the post-1972 Clean Water Act, but not in the context of preliminary
injunctive relief. In Middlesex Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), the
Court was concerned with statutory pre-emption of an implied action for money damages under
the citizen suit provision. Plaintiff fishermen in Sea Clammers claimed that as private citizens,
they had a right to relief outside the citizen's suit provision (Section 505 of the 1972 Amendments).
They reasoned that this section left open any remedy available under another statute or common
law, because of the savings clause in the section. Id. at 9. However, the Supreme Court held that
when remedial devices provided in the statute are sufficiently comprehensive, their presence may
demonstrate an intent to preclude remedies at common law or under other statutes. Id. at 20.
In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), the Supreme Court held that there was
no federal common law basis for a court to impose additional sanctions to those mandated in the
Clean Water Act. Id. at 319-24. Therefore, a common law claim of public nuisance in an area
pre-empted by the 1972 permit scheme was no longer cognizable in the federal district courts.
88. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d at 501, 520. But see id. at 501 n.7. The court stated
that all references to the Clean Water Act are to that statute as it existed prior to the 1972 amendments unless otherwise noted. However, it could be argued that a similar interpretation would
apply to the present emergency provision now codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1976). It certainly
seems that statutory interpretation in 1975 would be influenced by the spirit under which Congress
passed the 1972 amendments. See 514 F.2d at 528, n. 70, in which the court implicitly acknowledges the similar intent behind the 1972 and pre-1972 provisions.
89. 514 F.2d at 513, 519.
90. Id. at 528-29, n. 71.
91. Id. at 536. Reserve Mining partially dispenses with traditional criteria when Congress
establishes that an injunction is appropriate when a health hazard exists. However, the Reserve
Mining decision preserves inherent equitable power under certain circumstances. For example, it
used discretion to resolve the quality of the injunction: Although it looked to legislative intent
and the word "endangering" in the statute to decide whether it would issue an injunction, the
traditional requirement of immediate irreparable harm governed both the timing and scope.
Therefore, the court held that although there was a risk to public health, the defendant must be
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Reserve Mining is still good law with respect to the appropriateness
of injunctive relief for potential health hazards. However, federal district courts subsequently conflicted in their approach to injunctive relief
in non-health contexts after the 1972 Amendments. 9 2 The court in
93
UnitedStates v. Boardof Trustees ofFloridaKeys Community College
held that the plaintiff must still meet the traditional tests for equitable
remedies. In FloridaKeys, the College had filled an open slough 94 on
its property without obtaining a dredge and fill permit from the Army
Corps of Engineers. Both the Refuse Act and the Clean Water Act
required this permit. The government subsequently requested an injunction in the form of a mandatory decree 95 requiring the College to
restore the slough to its original swampy condition. However, the court
merely required the defendants to replant a small area with mangroves
upstream from the original swampy area. 96 The court's rationale was
that, when assessing civil remedies under the Clean Water Act, the degree and kind of wrong, as well as the practicality of the remedy, is
important. 97 It also concluded that civil penalties sufficiently deterred
future violations.
given sufficient time to comply with the pollution control order before the facilities could be closed
down.
92. See infra notes 93, 98, 102.
93. 531 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
94. Id. at 269.
95. Id. at 275.
96. See also U.S. v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
Although this case was decided under the National Resource and Recovery Act and the Safe
Drinking Water Act, it posed statutory interpretation problems similar to those arising under the
Clean Water Act 1972 Amendments. In Price, the United States brought suit to remedy the hazard caused by chemical dumping at Price's landfill in Pleasantville, New Jersey during 1971 and
1972. The government requested that Price alleviate the leakage of chemical wastes from his
property. It also requested that Price find another source of drinking water for the nearby community because his landfill had contaminated the well water.
The court relied on several arguments when it denied the government's requested remedies.
First, the court noted that neither the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act nor the Safe
Drinking Water Act explicitly deprive the court of its traditional power to balance equities.
Therefore, the traditional four-part test for preliminary injunctions survived passage of both statutes. The court did concede that where a statute specifically authorized injunctive relief, a showing of irreparable harm may be unnecessary, but only if Congress had made the determination
that the statutory violations be enjoined. However, relying on Hecht, the court did not believe
"that the traditional equitable discretion of the court is entirely irrelevant whenever a statute
specifically provides for injunctive relief." 523 F. Supp. at 1066. This was especially true, according to the Price court, if the court orders an affirmative, mandatory act, rather than negatively
restraining an ongoing violation. Affirmative relief changes the status quo. Therefore, it is not
appropriate as temporary relief before trial. This analysis, of course, does not mean that the same
kind of affirmative relief would be inappropriate after the trial.
It is interesting that Congress passed the National Resource and Recovery Act in 1976 and
the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1974, within a few years of the Clean Water Act Amendments.
They were undoubtedly influenced to the same extent by the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendment
debates, hearings and testimony.
97. 531 F. Supp. at 275. The Court held: "First, in contrast to the egregrious violations docu-
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On the other hand, at least two cases implicitly dispensed with the
traditional requirements for requesting injunctions. In United States v.
Lee Wood Contracting,Inc. 98 the United States requested injunctive
relief and civil penalties against the defendant corporation. The corporation had dumped fill material into an area immediately adjacent to
navigable waters without obtaining a permit from the Army Corps of
Engineers as required by the Clean Water Act. 99 The judge held that
since this company had been aware of its ongoing violation, a civil penalty was appropriate in addition to permanent injunctive relief. l°° As
to the property or scope of the injunction, however, the judge did not
refer to statutory language, legislative intent, or his inherent equitable
authority as chancellor. Instead, he simply issued an affirmative injunction to the defendant to immediately remove the sludge.' 0' In
United States v. City of Detroit102 the judge appointed a receiver to
supervise sewage treatment facilities until the city remedied the Clean
Water Act violations. The court found a broad range of equitable pow03
ers existed under the statute to effectuate its orders and judgments.
However, while the court found that plenary equitable power existed
under the statute, as in Lee Wood, there was no explicit discussion of
traditional criteria, especially irreparable harm. 104
The district and circuit court decisions discussed above conflict or
are silent on whether fulfillment of traditional equitable criteria is necessary for preliminary injunctive relief under the Clean Water Act
Amendments. The United States Supreme Court addressed the question in Romero-Barcelo where the central question was whether a district court can deny preliminary injunctive relief despite a continuing
Clean Water Act violation. 105
mented in Moretti. . .this court concludes the instant violations were negligent rather than willful." Id.
98. 529 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
99. Id. at 119.
100. Id. at 121-22.
101. Id. at 121.
102. 476 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
103. Id. at 520.
104. Id.

105. But see U.S. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D. Il.1982) (memorandum opinion and order). The court held that a mandatory affirmative injunction to clean up past
and ongoing PCB discharges into Lake Michigan was appropriate under Section 309 (a) and (b) of
the Amendments. Judge Getzendanner's arguments were purely statutory. She did not address
whether equitable considerations enter into a decision of whether to grant preliminary injunctions
under this provision.
The memorandum order in this four year old litigation between the United States and Outboard Marine came down several months after the Romero-Barcelo Supreme Court decision.
However, it is still relevant for two reasons. First, it stands for the proposition that the traditional
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The District Court Decision. Barcelo v. Brown
Barcelo v. Brown 10 6 began while the Navy was conducting bombing practice off the coast of the small Puerto Rican island of Vieques.
Several years after the Navy activity had commenced, the residents
complained of noise pollution, water pollution, and damage to the
coral reef and endangered species of the island. 0 7 The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico sued the Navy for violating several federal and
commonwealth environmental statutes, including the Clean Water Act,
for tortious Navy conduct and for the "taking of property without just
compensation."10 8
The lower court dismissed the tortious damage claims because the
plaintiffs had not fulfilled jurisdictional requirements by filing with the
appropriate federal agency.' 0 9 It also dismissed the "taking of property" claim because the six-year statute of limitations period had run
many years prior to filing of the suit." 0 With respect to the Clean
Water Act claims, the court found that the bombing of navigable waters was pollution within the meaning of 33 U.S.C. Section 131 l(a) or
1323(a)." Therefore, the Navy was required to have a permit in order
to conduct bombing practice despite the fact that the EPA did not have
a regulation providing a permit for the discharge of bombing refuse
into the water." 12
The district court did not enjoin the Navy from bombing practice
while it prepared its permit application for the Environmental Protection Agency." 3 The court followed the reasoning in Hecht Co. v.
Bowles," 4 that the purpose of an injunction is to deter and not to punish. 115 The Brown court also concluded that there were other reasons
why preliminary injunctive relief was not appropriate. First, the
discretion of the court is minimal under the facts of this case, e.g., ongoing violations with no
significant effort to comply. In the alternative, since the litigation began years before the RomeroBarcelo decision it could be construed as previous case law allowing mandatory affirmative relief
under 309(a) and (b) without the traditional showing of irreparable harm.
106. 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979), af'd sub nom., 456 U.S. 305 (1983).
107. Id. at 651.
108. Id. at 662-63.
109. Id. at 662.
110. Id. at 663.
111. Id. at 663-64.
112. Id. at 664.
113. Id. at 707.
114. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
115. 478 F. Supp. at 707.
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Navy's activities were not causing appreciable harm to the ecology," ,6
and second, the equitable defense of laches" 7 was available to the
Navy because citizens of Vieques had waited several years prior to filing their complaint. ' 8 However, the most important reason that the
court did not grant the preliminary injunction was its great concern
about jeopardizing economic and military interests if naval operations
were shut down. It concluded that grieveous and irreparable harm
might come to the national welfare if the operation were to cease
immediately. 19
The First Circuit Decision on preliminary injunctive relief
Romero-Barcelo v. Brown
In the subsequent appeal by Puerto Rico to the First Circuit 20, the
court considered whether the Navy should be enjoined from bombing
while the EPA reviewed the permit application.' 2' The Court of Appeals held that the district court had erred in balancing Puerto Rico's
and the Navy's competing equities.' 22 Citing TVA v. Hill, the court
held that "[wihether or not the Navy's activities in fact harm the coastal
waters, it has an absolute statutory obligation to stop any discharges of
pollutants until the permit procedure has been followed.' 23 Therefore, the circuit court ordered the district court to enjoin the Navy's
bombing pending EPA action on the permit. 124
The Supreme Court Decision: Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo
The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether
the Clean Water Act requires the granting of an immediate preliminary
injunction against all illegal discharges.' 25 Justice White, writing for
the majority, 126 began the opinion with a lengthy essay stressing that an
injunction was an extraordinary remedy and that the Court had repeat116. Id. at 706.
117. Id. at 707.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 708.
120. 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981).
121. Id. at 861. The Navy required a national pollution discharge elimination system permit.
(NPDES) On appeal, there remained eight unresolved issues. Id. at 840. One such issue, the
NEPA environmental impact statement, became moot when the Navy submitted the NPDES ap-

plication pursuant to the district court's order.
122. Id. at 861.

123. Id.
124. Id. at 862.
125. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
126. White's opinion was joined by Justices Burger, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehnquist

and O'Connor.
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edly held that the basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts had
127
always been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies.
Justice White stated that Congress was "assuredly well aware" of these
practices and that it would require a clear congressional intent before
the Court would depart from this practice. 28 In the TVA case the
Court would have been "'hard pressed to find a statutory provision

whose terms were any plainer.'

",129

More important to the Court's reasoning, however, was that the
only way to achieve compliance in TV was by an injunction. In the
case before the Court, fines or criminal penalties could insure compliance. Ordering the Navy to apply for a permit had enough to achieve
the objectives of the Act, the integrity of the nation's waters.1 30 The
permit itself was not the purpose of the FWPLA.
The Court found that because the statutory scheme recognized
that it could be achieved only through phased compliance, Congress
did not thereby intend to deny courts their traditional equitable
31
discretion.
The Court's final consideration was the effect of an FWPLA provision which allows the President to exempt federal facilities from compliance with permit requirements. 32 The Court maintained that the
Court of Appeals found that this provision indicated a congressional
intent to limit the court's discretion and that only paramount national
interests would justify failure to comply, a determination of which
should be made only by the President. 33 The Court held this reading
would be too broad. A court's purpose in exercising equitable discretion was to achieve compliance with the act. The exemption served a
different purpose-allowing noncompliance in extraordinary circumstances.134 Thus, the Court decided the proper standard for appellate
review was whether the district court had abused its discretion in denying an injunction while the Navy applied for a permit and reversed and
135
remanded the case to the court of appeals.
127. 456 U.S. at 311-12.
128. Id. at 313.
129. Id., quoting T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978).
130. 456 U.S. at 314.
131. Id. at 316-17.
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
133. 456 U.S. at 318.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 320. Justice Powell concurred. In his opinion, the case should have been remanded to the appellate court with orders to affirm the district court decision. Justice Powell
believed the record clearly established that the district court had not abused its discretion by
refusing to enjoin the immeidate cessation of all discharges. Id. at 321.
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Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter. In his opinion, the navy's
violation was blatant and not merely technical. 36 He felt that such a
predicament was foreseen by Congress and like TV4, the only way to
37
insure compliance was through an injunction.
ANALYSIS OF THE ROMERO-BARCELO DECISION

The Supreme Court's decision covers issues of statutory interpretation, legislative intent, national security, and irreparable harm. The
Court considered these issues when it decided whether the Clean Water
Act required the district court to issue a preliminary injunction before
the Navy obtained its permit to continue bombing maneuvers. This
point is important because if equitable discretion survives the 1972
amendments, courts may abuse their discretion if they withhold injunctions when the statutory policy should prevail because of congressional
concern for health or environment. The Court's view is that the 1972
Clean Water Act modifies judicial power, but it does not totally preempt equitable jurisdiction. The following discussion analyzes the factors on which the Supreme Court relied to determine how the 1972
amendments alter equity. The Court's discussion of statutory language, legislative history, and previous case law indicate that public
health, national security, or irreparable harm affect the courts' jurisdiction. 38 However, the "bottom line" of the Supreme Court decision
remains that a statutory violation without more will not automatically
136. Id. at 324. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Id. Stevens felt that the language and legislative intent of the statute necessarily restricted
the Court's authority to decide when a request for injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. at 321.
Because of public interest considerations and the ordering of priorities by Congress in the statute,
there were circumstances which compelled preliminary injunctive relief. Id. at 326-28. Such circumstances were present in this case because the Navy, by the very nature of the violationdischarging ordnance into the water without a permit-had to be restrained. Consequently, Justice Stevens felt the only way to insure the Navy's compliance with the Clean Water Act was to
issue an injunction. His analysis is closer to that found in TV v. Hill in which the policy behind
the Endangered Species Act severely diminished the court's equitable discretion. In TV4 v. Hill,
the only way to save the snail darter was to issue an injunction. In Romero-Barcelo, the only way
in which to keep bomb refuse out of the water was to enjoin the Navy until it received a permit.
Id. at 332-3.
Stevens distinguished between cases which involve private interest and those which implicate
a public interest. Stevens believed that when Congress legislates to protect public interests, the
Court's discretion is always curtailed. Id. at 327. This is not to say, however, that all equitable
jurisdiction is gone forever. It only means that in a situation like Romero-Barcelo, the Court has
no room to maneuver when there is a blatant statutory violation. Id. at 324.
Stevens also believed that the distinction the majority found between the legislative intent
behind the statute in TV4 and the Clean Water Act is largely illusory. Instead, the TV,4 court
issued an injunction because it had "profound respect for the law and the proper allocation of
lawmaking responsibilities in our Government." Id. at 334-35.
138. See generally the House and Senate Reports, supra notes 70 and 75.
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trigger injunctive relief.139
Statutory Language and Legislative Intent

The language of the FWPCA enforcement amendments is of little
assistance for determining whether an injunction is mandatory for
every statutory violation. 40 The language in Section 309(b) ony indicates that the Environmental Protection Agency Administrator may
bring the appropriate action.14 Similarly, the citizens' suit provision 42
permits a private individual to bring suit, but does not indicate whether
an injunction must be granted for every violation. 43 Instead, it only
indicates that injunctive relief is a possible remedy. 44
Discovering the legislative intent behind the passage of such a
complex and comprehensive scheme as the Clean Water Act and its
numerous amendments is not easy task. 45 Nevertheless, the legislative
history of the 1972 enforcement amendments is not as equivocal as the
majority opinion suggests. The Senate and House Reports on the bill
indicate that the intent to halt pollution was as strong as the intent to
preserve endangered species under the 1973 Endangered Species Act in
139. See generally Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). See also Aluli v.
Brown, 437 F. Supp. 602 (D.Hawaii 1977) (national security); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390
(1976) (absence of irreparable injury); Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944) (dicta: public interest);
Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agcy, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (balancing of
health risks against drastic economic hardship).
140. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1976).
141. See supra note 76.
142. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976).
143. As in § 309, this same problem exists with the original sections 504 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1364 (1976)) and 313 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1976)): There is no mandatory language
which authorizes injunctive relief. This ambiguity leaves open the possibility that a defendant will
claim that an enforcement provision is merely jurisdictional and not substantive. If a court subsequently finds the provision jurisdictional only, it will provide a possible remedy for violations
committed under other sections of the statute.
This problem continues to crop up under other environmental statutes. See U.S. v. Outboard
Marine, 549 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D.Ill. 1982) (discussing whether the injunctive relief provisions of
CERCLA are merely jurisdictional or are substantive and thus intrinsically create their own
liability).
144. But see 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1976) (formally Section 504 of the 1972 Amendments). This
emergency provision could be construed as mandating injunctive relief if the Environmental Protection Agency files a suit in the appropriate district court. In any event, the argument would be
strongest under this section that the only effective remedy for an immediate health hazard is an
injunction.
145. See Greenhouse, Supreme Court.- Probing Congressional Intent, The N. Y. Times, Oct.
22, 1982, col. 2 at A16. The article specifically discussed the federal tax status of Bob Jones University. The article's author points out, and probably with merit that: "The process of statutory
construction is often criticized as providing an intellectually respectable cloak under which judges
simply make their own policy choices. The rules of statutory construction do often sound more
helpful than they really are, and are readily tailored to achieve a particular result." Id.
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TV v. Hill. 46 Because both TVA v. Hill and Romero-Barcelo involved
violations by federal entities it is important to compare legislative intent between the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act
Amendments to determine if and how requirements for government
agencies differ under these laws. In Section Seven of the Endangered
Species Act it is clear that enforcement against federal agencies should
be swift and effective.' 47 The Senate Report on the 1972 Amendments
to the Clean Water Act states that the government must comply with
the Act since it has no more right to pollute than any private party.
Addressing section 313 on federal facilities pollution control, the report
reads in unequivocal language "This section would require every federal agency . . . to provide national leadership in the control of water
pollution . . This section requires that federal facilities meet all control requirements as if they were private citizens ....,,148 Although
146. Congressman Dingell, Head of the Wildlife Committee, presented the original draft of
the Endangered Species Act to the House of Representatives. The original draft read in part:
(c)

It is further declared to be the policy of Congress that all Federal Departments and
agencies shall seek to protect endangered species and threatened species and shall
utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purpose of this Act.
119 Cong. Rec. 30157 (Sept. 18, 1973).
The draft bill for the Endangered Species Act also provided for exceptions, just as did the
1972 Clean Water Act Amendments. Section 10 of the draft reads in pertinent part:
(a)
The Secretary may permit. . . any act otherwise prohibited by Section 9 of this
Act for scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected species.
(b)(l) If any person enters into a contract. . .(prior to the listing of a species as endangered). . . and the subsequent listing of that species will cause undue economic
hardship to that person. . . the Secretary. . .may exempt such person from the

application of Section 9(a) of the Act ....
119 CONG. REC. 30160 (Sept. 19, 1973) (Statement of Cong. Dingell, excerpt from draft bill).
It is not clear whether 10(b) is applicable to federal agencies.
With respect to Section 309 of the Clean Water Act, the Senate Report reads:
The Committee believes that if the timetables established throughout the Act are to
be met, the threat of sanction must be real, and enforcement provisions must be swift
and direct. Abatement orders, penalty provisions, and rapid access to the Federal District Court should accomplish the objective of compliance.
Senate Report, supra note 75, at 65.
Discussion of Section 504 of the Clean Water Act in the House Report is brief. However, it
makes clear that the Administrator can, without regard to any other provision in the act, bring an
immediate restraining order in a federal district court if there is an imminent and substantial
endangerment to public health. House Report, supra note 70, at 132.
In addition to the above discussion in the reports, it is informative to compare the old Clean
Water Act with the 1972 amendments. There are no comparable provisions in the original act
with respect to direct federal enforcement, federal facility pollution control, or emergency powers
of the Administrator. Id. at 287-91.
147. The Congressional Record reads in part:
• . .(all federal agencies must) insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by
them do not jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered species or result in the
destruction or modification or habitants of such species. ..."
119 CONG. REC. 30159 (Sept. 18, 1973) (Statement of Cong. Dingell, excerpt from draft bill).
148. Senate Report, supra note 75, at 67.
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Section 313 provides for government compliance, presumably courts
could apply the same enforcement provisions in the amended act to
government as well as private defendants. However, the Senate Committee recognized that on occasion a federal agency may need to operate in the national interest notwithstanding the Act's requirements.
The law provides for this contingency in an exemption provision which
requires the President's permission. The Senate Report is clear that
49
this provision should be used only in extraordinary situations. 1
The Committee Report's criticism of federal agencies in general
and the military in particular'5 0 further demonstrates congressional intent that all federal agencies comply with the Clean Water Act. Unfortunately, the Romero-Barcelo majority decision mistakenly found
stronger environmental concerns behind the Endangered Species Act
than it did with the amended Clean Water Act.' 5' Instead, the
Supreme Court should have recognized that analysis of legislative intent is not crucial to arriving at a different result in Romero-Barcelo
than in TVA because both legislative histories indicate the priority of
environmental goals for federal agencies. The provision for presidential exemptions in the Clean Water Act only emphasizes that Congress
52
wanted the enforcement provisions to apply in most situations.

149. Id. at 68. The Senate Report reads: "The Committee recognizes ... that it may be in
the paramount interest of the United States that a plant or facility not achieve full water pollution
control within the time required. Therefore, the bill would provide case by case exemptions on
the basis of determinations by the President ..
" Id.
150. The House Report, supra note 70, reads: "The Committee, after hearing of numerous
examples of flagrant violation of pollution controls is determined that the Federal facilities shall
be a model for the Nation, and that unless exempted by the President, they shall be required to
meet all requirements as if they were private citizens." Id. at 118-19.
The Senate Report, supra note 75, reads in similar language with respect to why Section 313
was added:
Evidence received in hearings disclosed many incidents of flagrant violations of air
and water pollution requirements by federal facilities and activities. Lack of Federal
leadership has been detrimental to the water pollution control effort. The federal government cannot expect private industry to abate pollution if the federal government continues to pollute.
Id. at 67.
Similarly, on Section 505 (Citizen's suit provision) the Senate Report reads:
[A]s recognized under Section 313 of the bill, federal facilities generate considerable
water pollution. Since some federal agencies such as the Department of Defense, have
failed in abating pollution and in requesting appropriations to develop control measures,
it is important to provide that citizens can seek, through the courts, to expedite the government performance specifically directed under Section 313.
Id. at 80.
151. 456 U.S. at 314.
152. See id. at 324 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Pre-emption of equitablejurisdiction.. Romero-Barcelo and its
relationship to previous case law
The Supreme Court erred when it distinguished intent behind the
Endangered Species Act from that of the Clean Water Act Amendments. However, it was correct in its determination that equitable authority is not eliminated by the 1972 Clean Water Act Amendments.
Although Romero-Barcelo and TVA reached different results, both
cases support this conclusion since TVA never expressly held that the
Endangered Species Act takes away all equitable authority in every instance. 53 There are two other reasons for the difference in outcome
between these two Supreme Court decisions. First, given the possibility
of irreversible harm to the snail darter in TVA and the policy behind
the Endangered Species Act, the Court had no choice but to enjoin the
completion of the federal dam. 54 On the other hand, in RomeroBarcelo, the district court did not find the Navy's bombing irreversibly
harmed the water1 5 5 and according to the majority opinion, there was
no direct clash with the statutory policy. Therefore, the plaintiffs in
Romero-Barcelo had two extra hurdles which were not present in TVA:
no factual basis for alleging irreparable harm and no demonstration of
153. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The majority decision reads in pertinent part:
Having determined that there is an irreconcilable conflict between operation of the Tellico Dam and the explicit provisions of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, we
must now consider what remedy, if any, is appropriate. It is correct, of course, that a
federal judge sitting as a chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction
for every violation of the law. This Court made plain in Hecht v. Bowles . . . that '[a]
grant of jurisdiction (emphasis added in the original) to issue compliance orders hardly
suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and all circumstances.'
Id. at 193.
The Romero-Barcelo Court noted that: "Congress may intervene and guide or control the
exercise of the courts' discretion, but we do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to
depart from established principles." 456 U.S. at 313, relying on Hecht P. Bowles, 321 U.S. at 329.
Apparently, the big "ideological" difference between Romero-Barcelo and TVA may lie in specifying to what extent Congress can modify the courts' discretion. According to the Romero-Barcelo
majority, Congress' authority is limited unless there is either mandatory language or when there is
a violation which completely conflicts with the purpose of the statute. Id. at 313, 320.
154. The TVA v. Hill majority opinion reads in pertinent part:
[N]either the Endangered Species Act nor Art. III of the Constitution provides federal courts with authority to make. . . fine utilitarian calculations. On the contrary, the
plain language of the Act, buttressed by its legislative history, shows clearly that Congress viewed the value of endangered species as incalculable.
437 U.S. at 187. Furthermore:
Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the
balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities,
thereby adopting a policy which it described as 'institutionalized caution.'
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute.
Id. at 194.
155. 456 U.S. at 320.
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a direct confrontation with the Clean Water Act policy. 56 Furthermore, the injunction in TVA was a permanent one 157 and it did not
require the traditional four-part test for preliminary injunctive relief.
United States v. Reserve Mining Co. 158 is more difficult to analogize to Romero-Barcelo on whether equitable authority survives the
1972 amendments for two reasons. First, Reserve Mining relied on the
pre-1972 Water Quality Act. 159 Secondly, the case addressed health
and not ecological damages.1 60 Nevertheless, Reserve Mining is instructive because it used traditional equitable principles to define the
scope of a remedy for a statutory violation.' 6' Therefore, the court refused to close down the factory immediately. It did not find an imminent health hazard, although it found that discharge of asbestos into
the air and water constituted pollution which endangered health within
the meaning of the Act. 162 Reserve Mining stands for the proposition
that the court can still balance the equities and refuse to grant injunc156. Ironically, the plaintiffs could not establish a violation when the Navy was in the process
of complying by waiting for its permit from the EPA.
157. 437 U.S. at 156, 172.
158. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir, 1975).
159. Id. at 501 n.7.
160. See generally id. at 501.
161. The court explained its policy in this area by stating:
Congress has generally geared its national environmental policy to allow polluting
industries a reasonable period of time to make adjustments in their efforts to conform to
federal standards. . . . In the absence of an imminent hazard to health or welfare, any
other program for abatement of pollution would be inherently unreasonable and invite
great economic and social disruption.
514 F.2d at 537.
Instead the court wanted to balance the equities: "We believe that on this record the district
court abused its discretion by immediately closing this major industrial plant. . . . A remedy
should be fashioned which will serve the ultimate public weal by insuring clean air, clean water,
and continued jobs in an industry vital to the nation's welfare." Id. at 537.
Earlier in the opinion, the court addressed the appropriate remedy: "In fashioning relief in a
case such as this involving a possibility of future harm, a court should strike a proper balance
between the benefits conferred and the hazards created by Reserve's facility." Id. at 535. However, the court also pointed out that a case in which public health was at stake presented a higher
degree of urgency than that of ecological damage alone. Id. at 538.
162. Id. at 535-41. It is not entirely clear from the opinion exactly how the court feels about
injunctive relief generally under either the Clean Water Act or the Refuse Act. Equally confusing
is the fact that although the court claims that it is using the pre-1972 Clean Water statute (because
this is when the original harm occurred and the action was instigated) it seems to rely on the
emergency provision of the 1972 amendments. Id. at 528 n.70. What is clear is that the court
found, after extensive expert testimony, that the water pollution was less pervasive or harmful
than the air pollution. Consequently, although the injunctive relief was issued under all three
Acts (Clean Air, Refuse, and Clean Water) the injunction for air pollution was more stringent
than the the injunction for water pollution. Id. at 529-30 n. 72.
As to whether a health hazard under the common law of nuisance automatically triggers
injunctive relief the court said: "We are not here concerned with standards applied to abatement
of a nuisance under non-statutory common law doctrines. In most common law nuisance cases
involving alleged harmful health effects some present harm or at least an immediate threat of
harm must be established..." Id. at 529 n.71. Such language suggests that although the court
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tions despite a statute which provides for such a remedy. RomeroBarcelo is consistent with this approach in its assertion that inherent
equitable power still exists. The difference is that Reserve Mining used
that power to alter the timing and scope of an injunction whereas Romero-Barcelo used it to deny a preliminary injunction in the first
63
instance. 1
District court decisions prior to Romero-Barcelo which were decided under the 1972 amendments do not explicitly hold that a court
can refuse an injunction after a statutory violation. On the contrary,
these cases imply that immediate equitable relief is appropriate, although how much and what kind is the court's ultimate decision. For
example, in United States v. Lee Wood Contracting,Inc. ,164 the court
simply enjoined a dumping and dredging violation and ordered the filled area returned to its original condition. There is no explanation why
injunctive relief was appropriate. Instead, the court merely entered the
order as soon as it made the requisite factual finding that the statutory
violation had occurred. 65 In UnitedStates v. Board of Trustees of Florida Keys Community Colleges166, the court did not issue a mandatory
injunction to restore a slough to its original condition. It did, however,
impose a mandatory decree to replant another comparable area on the
campus. 167 The court fashioned this modified injunctive relief with the
policies of the Clean Water Act and Refuse Act in mind. This injunction, in turn, was modified by the facts of the case and the willfulness of
68
the defendant.
Unlike the Romero-Barcelo approach, however, the FloridaKeys
court, although claiming to temper the Clean Water Act with a "touch
of equity", limited its discretion to the type of injunctive relief and not
to whether there should be any injunction whatsoever. The same logic
appeared in UnitedStates v. City of Detroit.169 Although City of Detroit
did not squarely address the scope of traditional equitable authority
retains discretion, in the presence of a statutory provision, there is no need to demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits or immediate irreparable harm.
163. 456 U.S. at 320.
164. 529 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
165. Id. at 121. See also U.S. v. Outboard Marine, 549 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D. I11.1982). Judge
Getzendanner seems to assume that an ongoing statutory violation of the Clean Water Act automatically merits some form of injunction under § 309(b).
For other cases ordering mandatory injunctive relief under the Clean Water Act, apparently
under Section 309(b) see United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331 (M.D. Fla. 1980) and
Parkview Corp. v. Department of the Army, 490 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
166. 531 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
167. Id. at 276.
168. Id. at 275.
169. 476 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
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under the Act, the court implied that it survives in full force. In fact,
the judge stated that a receivership was appropriate because "[t]he exercise of such authority is founded in the broad range of equitable powers available to this court to enforce and effectuate its orders and
judgments."'' 7 0 In this respect, City of Detroit is consistent with Romero-Barcelo, but only in the context that once the statutory violation
has occurred, the type of injunctive relief is within the court's discretion. Because City of Detroit involved a permanent injunction which
became an equitable receivership, it is difficult to reconcile its discussion of the inherent equitable power of the court with mandatory injunctive relief.' 7' Apparently, the court relied on the statutory
72
violation to initially justify some sort of equitable remedy.
Based on the above decisions, the Romero-Barcelo Court followed
precedent when it held that equitable jurisdiction remains after the
170. Id. at 520.
171. The court appointed the Mayor of Detroit to be the Administrator of the wastewater
treatment plant for purposes of carrying out the obligations of Detroit under the consent judgement entered by the court on September 14, 1977. This order comprised the equitable receivership portion of his order. 476 F. Supp. at 515.
A mandatory injunction requires the performance of an affirmative act, rather than forbidding an act. DOBBS, supra note 10 at 105.
172. 476 F. Supp. at 520-21. In another recent decision under the 1972 amendments, a federal
district court denied a preliminary injunction under Section 504 of the Act. United States v.
Vertac Chemical Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980). The court in Vertac found an imminent health hazard when dioxin, a powerful poison, leaked from a chemical factory in Arkansas.
Notwithstanding this serious hazard, the court relied on the Reserve Mining balancing of equities
approach to minimize economic hardship as well as the health risk. 1d. at 886. As in Reserve
Mining, the balancing went to the scope and nature of the injunction rather than whether or not to
issue one. However, contrary to Reserve Mining in which the court denied immediate abatement,
the Vertac court ordered the defendant to immediately remove leakage from past and present
dioxin contamination.
In an analogous line of cases under a different statute, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, two federal district courts granted preliminary injunctions to the federal government. In United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D.Ind. 1980) the
court held: "In determining whether the government should be afforded the preliminary injunctive relief it requests, the Court is guided by common law principles and by Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. at 143. Although the government-plaintiff argued that the Act
made the statutory remedies substantive and not merely jurisdictional, the court disagreed. Instead, it held that if the statutory 'endangerment' existed without the showing of irreparable harm
needed under the traditional four-part test, then it would not order a preliminary injunction. Fortunately for the government, the court found that contamination of the local drinking water by the
defendant's toxic waste runoff fulfilled the irreparable injury test. Therefore, the government obtained a preliminary affirmative injunction directed to Price to clean up his property.
Similarly, in United States v. Solvents Recovery Service, 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D.Conn. 1980),
the court held that Section 7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 authorizing injunctive relief when there is an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment" is only jurisdictional. Id. at 1131. Therefore, it does not provide any standards for
when an injunction must issue. The judge in Solvents Recovery Service relied on granting the
injnction under the traditional judicial standards and the federal common law of nuisance. Resort
to the federal common law of nuisance, however, is now foreclosed by the 1981 decision of City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
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1972 Clean Water Act Amendments. However, the question remains
as to what other policy considerations affect the type of equitable relief,
whether there must be an injunction in the first instance, or both.
Policies Which Alter the Scope of Equitable Jurisdictionin the Federal
District Courts
As noted above, the legislative history of the Clean Water Act
amendments does not clearly indicate whether Congress intended to
totally pre-empt traditional equitable discretion. 73 If equitable discretion does survive the Act, however, then a Committee Report is one
useful method for suggesting other policies which modify the scope of
such discretion. Public health, 74 discussed in previous sections, is an
important priority. 175 Irreparable ecological harm also deserves special
attention as was implied in the Barcelo v. Brown district court decision. 17 6 Furthermore, Romero-Barcelo, as well as other case law, 77
suggests that extensive environmental damage may influence a court to
grant a preliminary or permanent injunction, particularly if a natural
resource may be irreparably destroyed before a trial on the merits.
Nevertheless, if the courts find that environmental policy threatens national security, they will deny injunctions in favor of that policy.
Therefore, if the defendant in the litigation is the military, the defendant will undoubtedly prevail.
IrreparableInjury to the Environment
The Romero-Barcelo majority would not grant injunctive relief if:
(a) it is merely available in the enforcement provisions as a possible
remedy, and, (b) there is another remedy in the statute which will insure compliance. If compliance is possible without the destruction of a
precious natural resource, then the court should use a less drastic alternative to a preliminary injunction. The district court found that no
species would disappear and that the bombing did not damage the
coral reefs.' 78 This factual finding is in sharp contrast to the facts in
173. See generally House Report, supra note 70.
174. The Senate Report, supra note 75 reads in pertinent part: "This emergency authority
provides for immediate, effective action whenever the discharge of water pollutants reach levels of
concentration that present an imminent or substantial endangerment of the health or welfare of
person." Id. at 78.
175. See also 456 U.S. at 327 (public interest) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. 478 F. Supp. at 707-08. See also 456 U.S. at 311-12.
177. See California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.Cal. 1980), modfied, 690 F.2d 753 (9th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Board of Trustees of Florida Keys Community College, 531 F. supp.
267 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Aluli v. Brown, 437 F. Supp. 602 (D.Hawaii 1977).
178. Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 682-84, 687-90 (D.P.R. 1979).
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TVA v. Hill in which civil penalties or criminal sanctions would not
bring the snail darter back to life. According to traditional criteria,
then, the Romero-Barcelo district court did not abuse its discretion because the occasional bombing did not cause irreparable ecological
injury.
In Romero-Barcelo typifies the trend in environmental law, then
the appropriateness of preliminary or permanent injunctions will always depend on the circumstances of each case. Previous decisions
under the Clean Water Act and statutes such as NEPA have already
followed this reasoning. In the recent NEPA case, California v. Bergland,179 the court found an injunction necessary to protect undeveloped
wilderness areas from development while the federal agency prepared
the environmental impact statement. The Bergland court's stated ra180
tionale was that an injunction should follow every NEPA violation.
However, an argument could be made that the underlying rationale
was that the magnitude and irreversibility of the harm could only be
alleviated by immediate cessation.181 In two other NEPA cases, Kleppe
v. Sierra Club, 82 and State ofAlaska v. Andrus,183 the courts held that
injunctions were unnecessary while agencies prepared environmental
impact statements. The underlying rationale in these cases probably
was that the harm done while waiting for the statements was neither
84
irreparable nor sufficiently grievous. 1
Analogous distinctions appear in the Clean Water Act decisions.
In United States v. Lee Wood Contracting,Inc.,185 the court issued an
injunction to prevent the loss of a Michigan wetland which was irreplaceable if the defendant filled it with sludge. However, in United
States v. Board of Trustees of FloridaKeys Community College,186 the
court found that the defendants could replant the small affected area
elsewhere. Therefore, a mandatory injunction requiring restoration of
187
the original location was unnecessary.
179. 483 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
180. Id. at 498.
181. Id.

182. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
183. 580 F.2d 465 (D.C.Cir. 1978).
184. Id. at 486; see also 427 U.S. at 407-08.
185. 529 F. Supp. 119 (E.D.Mich. 1981).
186. 531 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
187. The cases which involved public health reveal the same tendency. In Reserve Mining and
Vertac Chemical, both cases purported to balance equities before granting immediate injunctions.
However, there were different results. Vertac granted an immediate affirmative cleanup order
while Reserve Mining did not grant an immediate injunction to close down the factory. The
Vertac court found immediate irreparable harm because of toxic waste runoff into the waterways.
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NationalSecurity
Military preparedness was a primary concern of the district court
when it decided not to grant a preliminary injunction. 8 8 The Supreme
Court found that the Presidential exemption allowing for noncompliance with the permit requirement under Section 313 of the Act was
inapplicable. The court found the equitable power of the court was to
order compliance. 8 9 The exemption was concerned only with noncompliance. Only if the Navy did not receive the permit, would the exemption become applicable. 90
Consequently, the Supreme Court's conclusion was faulty because
of its characterization of statutory violations and executive exemptions.
The original Senate Committee Report specifically states that any pollution by the federal government is unlawful.' 9 1 If a statutory violation, such as an unauthorized discharge is unlawful, then there cannot
simultaneously be compliance. Furthermore, of all the federal "agencies" the Navy is in the best position to obtain an executive exemption. 92 Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii 93 is an excellent
example of a recent decision in which the Supreme Court relied on a
similar statutory exemption. In Catholic Action, the defendant-Navy
prevailed because it had a statutory exemption under NEPA and the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). t 94 Under FOIA, if the information is exempted by an executive order, then the government may keep
it from the public in the interest of national security. There was a properly classified executive order for the requested environmental impact
statement in Catholic Action. The Supreme Court concluded that the
Navy could withhold the environmental impact statement from the
public, a finding which would conflict with the policy of NEPA but for
The Reserve Mining court did not consider the asbestos a sufficiently immediate irreparable harm
to public health to close down the plant.
The above two cases addressed health, but as in Florida Keys, presence of irreparable harm
influenced the scope and timing of the injunction. This survey of the environmental and health
cases demonstrates two ways in which courts factor in a showing of irreparable harm: the scope of
the remedy, or whether there will be an injunction in the first instance. In the first type, the
statutory policy prevails, but the courts discretion takes over as to scope and immediacy. In this
context, the Romero-Barcelo court did not follow either alternative because there was no showing
of irreparable harm whatsoever to take into consideration.
188. 478 F. Supp. at 707-08. The district court was concerned with the maintenance of the
United States' sea lanes.
189. 456 U.S. at 318 (emphasis in original).
190. Id.
191. See supra note 75, at 67.
192. 456 U.S. at 326 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
194. Currently codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976). Section 102(c) of NEPA (1978) provides for disclosure of environmental impact statements to the public, subject to the FOIA.

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

the statutory exemption. 9 5
The facts in Romero-Barcelo are not directly analogous to the situation in Catholic Action for two reasons. First, there is no secrecy issue
because everyone knew where and how long the Navy had conducted
bombing near Puerto Rico. Secondly, in Catholic Action, a very specific executive order already existed for exactly the kind of classified
information which was at issue. 196 The most confusing issue is that in
CatholicAction, the Court relied on this executive order to support the
Navy's position, whereas in Romero-Barcelo the Court totally ignored
the executive exemption opportunity.197 The reason why the Court rejected such recent reliance on the statutory exemption argument is
never adequately explained by Justice White's analysis in the RomeroBarcelo majority opinion. The Court's rationale, as stated earlier, is
that the exemption only extends to permanent noncompliance and that
in Romero-Barcelo, there was temporary noncompliance with no showing of irreparable injury to the water.' 98 Unfortunately, as Justice Stevens points out in his dissenting opinion, this is a blatant disregard for
the clear language of section 313, which provides that even federal entities must obey the law.19 9
Even without presidential exemptions, national security is a powerful policy argument. 2°° In the absence of express statutory language,
it may tip the balance of hardships in favor of the Navy. In Aluli v.
brown ,201 the facts were similar to those in Romero-Barcelo. The plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction while the Navy was in the process of complying with NEPA and the National Historic Preservation
195. 454 U.S. at 146.
196. Exec. Order No. 12065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1978-79). See 454 U.S. at 144 n.6.
197. The Court in Catholic Action said that: "Since the public disclosure requirements of
NEPA are governed by FOIA, it is clear that Congress intended that the public's interest in ensuring that federal agencies comply with NEPA must give way to the Government's need to preserve
military secrets." 454 U.S. at 145.
The above excerpt supports the proposition that when there is a direct conflict between the
language of the environmental statute and the asserted need to preserve military secrets, then
environmental policy will yield. In Catholic Action, Congress has done all the 'contingency planning' through the NEPA provisions providing for executive exemptions under FOIA. The
Supreme Court did not even have to address a factual finding as to whether the Navy was storing
nuclear weapons. Instead, it held that even if there were such weapons (and the Navy did not
have to respond to this assertion, according to the law), then the NEPA policy of public disclosure
need not be honored. Id. at 146.
198. 456 U.S. at 318-19.
199. Id. at 323 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875), on which the Court relied in Weinberger
v. Catholic Action of Hawaii for the proposition that military secrets are immune from judicial
review.
201. 437 F. Supp. 602 (D. Hawaii 1977).
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Act. 20 2 The district court denied the preliminary injunction when the
Navy presented testimony that the readiness of the fleet would be reduced by 30 to 40 per cent: "[a]lthough no measurement standards
were cited in arriving at these figures, the court finds that the reduction
would nevertheless be substantial. ' 20 3 Even when alternative sites were
considered and then rejected by the Navy, the A/uli district court still
204
found the Navy's objections reasonable.
The Supreme Court in Romero-Barcelo confirmed the policy in
Alu/ five years after that district court decision. In both cases, the
courts denied preliminary prohibitory injunctions against pollution but
issued orders which required the Navy to submit environmental impact
statements or permit applications. Apparently, when the Navy is the
defendant, a mandatory decree directed towards securing permanent
compliance within a reasonable time is an adequate remedy, while tem-

20 5
porarily closing down an entire military operation is not appropriate.

Significance of the Case
TV4 v. Hill and Hecht v. Bowles established the general proposition that equitable discretion can coexist with a statute providing for
injunctions. 2° 6 However, they did not delineate the scope and timing of
this discretion as a function of a specific statute, other federal policies,
and Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Romero-Barcelo
fills in several of these gaps under the 1972 Clean Water Act Amendments. First, the Court resolved that the Amendments do not totally
202. Id. at 610.
203. Id. at 611.
204. Id.
205. In A/uli v. Brown, the court found as fact that the Navy violated both NEPA and the
National Historic Preservation Act. However, when balancing the equities it found the tipping of
hardships going to the Navy with respect to shutting down the Navy's operation while it complied
with the first part of the court order. 437 F. Supp. at 611.
With respect to injunctions the court said:
Injunctive relief should be granted either where the plaintiff can establish a
probability of success on the merits and the showing of irreparable injury. . .Under the
alternate test adopted by the Ninth Circuit, injunctive relief may be granted if there are
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation
and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.
Id. at 610-11.
206. Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. at 329-30; TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 193-94. In Hecht v. Bowles
the Supreme Court remanded the case to the appellate court to determine if there had been an
abuse of discretion by the district court when it dismissed the request for injunctive relief. 321
U.S. at 331. Hecht, although not environmental law, is important because although the applicable
statute authorized an injunction for statutory violations, the court still denied one because of the
facts. The Court's rationale in Hecht was that an injunction would not deter inadvertant future
violations by the defendant. Id.
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pre-empt the court's power to withhold or order equitable relief.20 7 In
prior decisions the courts were not always clear as to whether they ordered an injunction because the plaintiff surmounted the traditional
tests as well as the statutory standard. 20 8 After Romero-Barcelo, courts
will not have to regard every statutory violation under sections 309 or
313 as irreparable injuryperse. 2 09 It follows from the above discussion
that at least in the context of purely ecological issues, the plaintiff must
demonstrate harm in fact which is immediate and irreparable under the
traditional test. 210 As to whether there is a lesser showing required for
a health hazard under section 504, Romero-Barcelo is silent. However,
the majority opinion acknowledges a rule in the FWPLA of immediate
cessation for statutory violations "presenting an 'imminent and substantial endangerment of the health of persons or to the welfare of persons.' "21t This language implies that traditional requirements for
either a preliminary or permanent injunction may not be required in
the area of public health.
Secondly, Romero-Barcelo expands the kind of factual situations
litigated under the 1972 Clean Water Act Amendments. Prior to this
case there was no Supreme Court decision in which plaintiffs requested
a preliminary injunction against a federal defendant under the
amended Act. Romero-Barcelo reinforces previous trends seen in cases
under several environmental statutes with respect to who the parties to
the litigation are and their ultimate chance for success on the merits.
For example, under most environmental statutes, a private party suing
any defendant will have difficulty. 21 2 Furthermore, in NEPA cases in
which private citizens sue non-military government agencies, the plain21 3
tiffs have to make an even stronger showing of irreparable injury.
When the federal government sues a private party, however, it is likely
to prevail. Congress drafted the original Water Quality Act to have the
litigation brought solely by the government. 21 4 As for a state suing a
private defendant under federal law, this attempt failed in at least one
207. 456 U.S. at 320.
208. See United States v. Lee Wood Contracting, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 119 (E.D.Mich. 1981);
United States v. City of Detroit, 476 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
209. 456 U.S. at 320.
210. Id. at 314 n.7.
211. Id. at 317.
212. See Middlesex County Sewerage v. National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1 (1981);
Citizens Assoc. of Georgetown v. Washington, 370 F. Supp. 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
213. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C.Cir.
1978).
214. See Note supra note 55, at 582-83.
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Clean Air Act case. 2 15
In the decisions discussed in this case comment, the private citizen
against a military defendant is the worst possible combination for the
plaintiff's success. One reason is that in general the private litigant cannot claim that he is an authority with respect to public policy: the
courts do not believe that he has the standing and stature to make this
kind of argument against an "expert" government agency in general 21 6
or against the armed forces in particular. 2 17 In Romero-Barcelo, this
also holds true for a state or state-like entity such as Puerto Rico: its
standing to bring the suit does not appear to be better than that of a
private citizen. 218 Unfortunately for this class of potential plaintiffs,
the Romero-Barcelo situation is not unusual. CatholicAction of Hawaii
and A/uli v. Brown are two other examples of cases in which a private
2 19
litigant has unsuccessfully confronted the Navy.
The federal government suing a non-military federal agency may
prevail. TV4 v. Hill is an example of the success of this type of action.
However, the federal government suing the military is a special subclass of federal suing federal. 220 Presumably, an important innovation
in the Clean Water Act Amendments is the section authorizing enforcement against federal pollutors. However, the practical significance of
this section is dubious because the federal government does not want to
sue the military: in CatholicAction of Hawaii, and Aluli v. Brown, the
plaintiffs were not the federal government. Similarly, Romero-Barcelo
does not detract from the long followed case law tradition 22' that courts
will not intrude in areas which the executive and congressional
222
branches also avoid.
Romero-Barcelo does not address the propriety of preliminary affirmative injunctions as compared to negative preliminary injunctions.
This omission probably occurred because the plaintiffs did not estab215. See Alabama Air Pollution Control Commission v. Republic Steel Corp., 646 F.2d 210
(5th Cir. 1981). But, note that the state suing a federal agency prevailed in California v. Bergland,
483 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.Cal. 1980).
216. See Citizens Assoc. of Georgetown v. Washington, 370 F. Supp. 1101, (D.D.C. 1974).
217. See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139, 146-47 (1981).
218. See generally Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
220. The author did not find a case where the federal government has sued the Armed Forces
under the Clean Water Act.
221. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
222. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. I (1972). See also Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139 (1981). In dicta the Court said: "Ultimately, whether or not the Navy has
complied with NEPA 'to the fullest extent possible' is beyond judicial scrutiny in this case." Id. at
146. This dictum implied that in matter of national security, judicial equitable discretion is
minimal.
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lish irreparable harm at the district court level. Since the Supreme
Court had decided that a mere statutory violation is not sufficient to
order an injunction, there was no need to decide what type of preliminary injunction would have been appropriate.
Although there are flaws in the Romero-Barcelo analysis, the
Supreme Court did give needed definition to the Clean Water Act
223
Amendments. The Refuse Act only applies to private pollutors.
Therefore, the scope of the Clean Water Act's control over federal defendants has to be tried and tested. 224 Inevitably, there are questions
left unanswered-after all, the amendments are only ten years old.
One such unresolved area is that of reconciling the substantial statutory
issues of remedies raised in Romero-Barcelo with procedural problems
in the federal courts. For example, the Supreme Court in RomeroBarcelo did not discuss how Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is reconciled with the Clean Water Act scheme. In fact, lower
federal court decisions did not seem very concerned about this problem
either. Inevitably, these questions will be resolved by decisions which
combine environmental issues with purported procedural violations,
presumably at the district court level.
CONCLUSION

In Romero-Barcelo, the Supreme Court interpreted the spirit of the
Clean Water Act very restrictively. Ironically, Congress drafted and
passed the 1972 amendments during a period in which there was considerable concern over national health and environmental problems
from pollution. Although Congress passed new laws in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, the courts consistently resorted to the Refuse Act for
injunctive relief. Congress drafted it under different circumstances and
it is "accepted" in its role as a strict enforcement tool againstprivate
defendants. Although the report on the original Refuse Act bill is silent, it is likely that Congress passed it for commercial reasons, for example, to facilitate navigation. Therefore, unlike the Clean Water
amendments, the Refuse Bill probably did not have to withstand a barrage of controversy. In addition, the Supreme Court in Wyandotte
TransportationCo. v. UnitedStates,225 gave an expansive interpretation
to the availability of injunctive relief under the Refuse Act. In sharp
contrast, the Romero-Barcelo Court gave the 1972 amendments a re223.
224.
security
225.

See supra note 56, at 4. See also 33 U.S.C. §§ 406, 407, 410, and 411 (1976).
Romero-Barcelo is precedent for the proposition that judge made exemptions for national
are as available as statutory exemptions under the Clean Water Act.
389 U.S. 191 (1967).
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strictive gloss only a decade after their inception. 226 If the Supreme
Court continues the Romero-Barcelo trend, then government agencies
will have more latitude to pollute when other national policies are involved. Furthermore, there is less likelihood that courts will enjoin
government agencies if these agencies are in the process of complying
227
with other requirements of the Act.
The issues in Romero-Barcelo are of statutory interpretation and
policies. Except for a possible separation of powers problem at the federal level, there is no constitutional question. Therefore the state
courts, as well as the federal courts, are not obligated to follow the
Supreme Court when they interpret local ordinances or state environmental legislation. 228 The effect of Romero-Barcelo on future case law
decided under the Clean Water Act's 1972 amendments is uncertain.
Romero-Barcelo spoke of the Clean Water Act only with respect to preliminary injunctions when the defendant is the Navy. Some maverick
district courts may continue to give injunctive relief without the tradi2 30
tional showing of irreparable injury. 229 U.S. v. OutboardMarine is
illustrative of this possibility. That decision relied on the Refuse Act
and the Clean Water Act to order a mandatory cleanup of the Milwaukee Harbor. Although the decision came down after Romero-Barcelo,
the district court relied on purely statutory arguments, as well as legislative intent. There was no mention of the necessity for the traditional
tests.
As in US v. OutboradMarine,some future district court decisions
may also rely exclusively on legislative intent and statutory language
and ignore Rule 65 or the traditional equitable prerequisites. 23 1 Perhaps these district courts believe that when the Supreme Court's inter226. See also Middlesex Sewerage v. National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), for the
Supreme Court's restrictive view of implied actions for damages under the amended Clean Water
Act.
227. Examples include the permit requirement in Romero-Barcelo or the preparation of adequate environmental impact statements in NEPA cases.
228. 456 U.S. at 311, 334-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229. See United States v. Lee Wood Contracting, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 119 (E.D.Mich. 1981);
United States v. West Penn Power Co., 460 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (Clean Air Act); United
States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Fla. 1975); and United States v. Underwood, 344 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.Fla. 1972) (Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act.)
230. 549 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see supra note 105.
231. In this respect the Refuse Act cases from the middle and southern federal district courts
in Florida are interesting. The author has not found a similar clustering of cases under any other
statute arising out of any other geographic section of the country. Apparently, from about 1970 to
1975, there was a local movement to preserve some commercially undeveloped areas in this region. See United States v. Underwood, 344 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.Fla. 1972); United States v. Joseph
G. Moretti, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D.Fla. 1974); United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 389
F. Supp. 602 (S.D.Fla. 1975).
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pretation of the law appears too restrictive, then it is up to the local
government to accomplish its objectives environmentally. In any
event, with a large selection of environmental statutes to choose from, a
district court should have no difficulty finding an alternative manner to
232
impose preliminary injunctive relief from water pollution.

232. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976); Clean Water
Act Amendments of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1364, 1365 (Supp. IV 1980); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1976); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976);
Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 300i (1976).

